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Be My Guest: The Hidden Holding of Minnesota v. Carter
Abstract
This Article first examines the Carter case in detail, including the opinions of the state courts and the briefs
and oral argument in the United States Supreme Court, before turning to the Court's decision. The Article
highlights the importance of Justice Kennedy's concurring opinion and explains the "hidden holding" of the
case, raising the question of whether lowercourts will apply the correct rule from the case. The Article argues
that the Court's denial of the defendants' claim of a reasonable expectation of privacy, combined with its
failure to provide guidance as to when non-overnight visitors in homes will have the ability to challenge a
search of that home, increases the danger that lower courts will impose a presumption against short-term
guests having an expectation of privacy in their host's home.The Article emphasizes that although a narrow
interpretation of the rights of non-overnight visitors is the path favored by several Justices, it does not
command a majority, and urges lower courts to take care to apply the correct rule from Carter, one that
broadly interprets the rights of short term visitors and avoids drawing a line at overnight guests.
The Article then briefly examines the United States Supreme Court's "standing" jurisprudence prior to Carter,
providing background for the analysis of the decision. The Article argues that the majority's ruling, that the
defendants had no reasonable expectation of privacy, undervalues expectations of interpersonal privacy of
citizens in a free society, unfairly diminishes legitimate expectations of privacy in a wide variety of
relationships the Court labels as "business" or "commercial," and overextends the reach of the "legitimately on
the premises" category of visitors to deny protection for certain relationships that deserve better. The Article
asserts the Minnesota Supreme Court was better able to put aside the illegal nature of the conduct involved
and avoid deciding important privacy issues based on labels. The Minnesota court's decision provided a
workable rule that was consistent with United States Supreme Court precedent and recognized and protected
the "everyday expectations of privacy that we all share."'
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ARTICLES
BE MY GUEST: THE HIDDEN HOLDING OF MINNESOTA V
CARTER1
by Edwin J Butterfoss2 andMary Sue B. Snyder'
I. INTRODUCTION
On a late spring evening in an apartment complex in the St. Paul suburb
of Eagan, Minnesota, Kimberly Thompson, Wayne Thomas Carter and
Melvin Johns sat at the kitchen table in Thompson's apartment, unaware that
for fifteen minutes someone had been peering through a small opening in the
drawn miniblinds of the apartment window observing their activities. The
"peeping Tom" was Officer James Thielen, investigating a tip he had
received moments earlier concerning the activities in the apartment. As pre-
dicted, Officer Thielen saw Thompson, Carter and Johns packaging cocaine.
Based on these observations, Officer Thielen set in motion a series of events
that led to the arrest and conviction of the occupants of the apartment. Carter
and Johns challenged Officer Thielen's activities as an unreasonable search
in violation of the Fourth Amendment. The Minnesota Supreme Court
upheld their claim, but the United States Supreme Court denied relief.
In Minnesota v. Carter4 the United States Supreme Court held that visi-
tors in an apartment who were not overnight guests, but "essentially present
for a business transaction and were only in the home a matter of hours,"5 had
no legitimate expectation of privacy in the apartment and could not chal-
lenge police conduct that the Minnesota Supreme Court had held constituted
an illegal search. Unlike many recent Fourth Amendment decisions by the
Rehnquist Court rendered with unanimity or near unanimity,6 the Carter
decision was five to four on the issue of whether the defendants enjoyed a
legitimate expectation of privacy. The case spawned three concurrences and
1. 545N.W.2d 695 (Mino. Ct. App. 1996),rev'd 569 N.W.2d 169 (Minn. 1997), rev', 119 S. C. 469(1998).
2. Dean and Professor of Law, Hamline University School of Law; B.S., 1977, Miami University (Ohio); I.D., 1980,
Georgetown University Law Center.
3. B.A., Carleton College; I.D., 1995, Hamline University School of Law.
4. 119 S. Ct. 469 (1998) [hereinaftr in footnctes as Carter III].
5. Id. at 473.
6. Most, but not all, of these decisiom were in favor of the goverranent. See, e.g., Maryland v. Wilson. 519 U.S. 408
(1997) (holding that an officer making a traffic stop may order passengers out of car); Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806
(1996) (holding unanimously that the stop of a motorist based on the probable cause of a traffic violation is constitutional regard-
less of the subjective motivation of the officer to investigate other crimes); Ohio v. Robinette. 519 U.S. 33 (1996) (holding that the
Fourth Amendment does not require a motorist to be advised that he is "free to go" before beingasked for consent to search vehi-
cle). But see Knowles v. Iowa, 119 S. Ct 484 (1998) (holding that an Iowa statute authorizing a search incident to the issuance of
a citation in lieu of an arrest violates the Fourth Amendment).
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a dissent to the majority opinion. In this respect the decision is reminiscent
of Warren Court decisions and even the early decisions of the Burger Court-
-but any similarity ends there.
The majority opinion in Carter was short in length and short on analy-
sis. With little explanation, it denied the visitors' claims of legitimate expec-
tations of privacy, but offered little guidance for future cases involving
visitors in homes. In future cases, courts will be tempted to characterize the
defendants in Carter as short-term visitors (or worse yet, non-overnight vis-
itors), point to the fact that these particular defendants were denied the right
to challenge the search, and conclude that the rule of Carter is that short
term visitors lack "standing." But Carter is a case that requires careful vote
counting. In the various Carter opinions, five Justices accepted the proposi-
tion that "almost all social guests have a legitimate expectation of privacy,
and hence protection against unreasonable searches, in their host's home.",
The question after Carter is whether this "hidden holding" will emerge, or
whether, relying on Chief Justice Rehnquist's majority opinion, lower courts
will impose the opposite rule--that short term visitors have no expectation of
privacy in their host's home. Worse yet, lower courts may even conclude a
bright line has been drawn to deny protection for visitors "whose head[s]
never [touch] a pillow."8
Carter is the second case from Minnesota this decade in which the
United States Supreme Court has addressed the issue of the expectations of
privacy held by a visitor in an apartment. Nine years ago, in Minnesota v.
Olson,9 the Court held that an overnight guest had a legitimate expectation
of privacy in his host's home. In Olson the Court drew a bright line in favor
of overnight guests, stating that its holding "merely recognizes the everyday
expectations of privacy that we all share."10 The Olson Court recognized
that "[s]taying overnight in another's home is a long-standing social custom
that serves functions recognized as valuable by society."' The Court in
Carter was unwilling to extend similar protection to visitors engaged in a
purely commercial transaction who spent a relatively short period of time on
the premises and lacked any previous connection to the lessee. The short-
coming of the Court's decision is not only in the result, but also in its failure
to provide any guidance as to when a guest who'is not staying overnight can
claim a legitimate expectation of privacy.
This Article first examines the Carter case in detail, including the opin-
ions of the state courts and the briefs and oral argument in the United States
Supreme Court, before turning to the Court's decision. The Article high-
lights the importance of Justice Kennedy's concurring opinion and explains
7. Carter 111, 119 S. C. at 478 (Kennedy, J., concurrin).
8. Daniel B. Yeager, Search. Seizure and the Positive Law: Expectations of Privacy Outside the Fourth Amendment
84 1. Qum. L. & CRIMNOLOoY 249,291 (1993).
9. 495 U.S. 91 (1990).




the "hidden holding" of the case, raising the question of whether lower
courts will apply the correct rule from the case. The Article argues that the
Court's denial of the defendants' claim of a reasonable expectation of pri-
vacy, combined with its failure to provide guidance as to when non-over-
night visitors in homes will have the ability to challenge a search of that
home, increases the danger that lower courts will impose a presumption
against short-term guests having an expectation of privacy in their host's
home. The Article emphasizes that although a narrow interpretation of the
rights of non-overnight visitors is the path favored by several Justices, it
does not command a majority, and urges lower courts to take care to apply
the correct rule from Carter, one that broadly interprets the rights of short
term visitors and avoids drawing a line at overnight guests.
The Article then briefly examines the United States Supreme Court's
"standing" jurisprudence prior to Carter, providing background for the anal-
ysis of the decision. The Article argues that the majority's ruling, that the
defendants had no reasonable expectation of privacy, undervalues expecta-
tions of interpersonal privacy of citizens in a free society, unfairly dimin-
ishes legitimate expectations of privacy in a wide variety of relationships the
Court labels as "business" or "commercial," and overextends the reach of
the "legitimately on the premises" category of visitors to deny protection for
certain relationships that deserve better. The Article asserts the Minnesota
Supreme Court was better able to put aside the illegal nature of the conduct
involved and avoid deciding important privacy issues based on labels. The
Minnesota court's decision provided a workable rule that was consistent
with United States Supreme Court precedent and recognized and protected
the "everyday expectations of privacy that we all share."' 2
II. STATE V CARTER: 13 THE STATE COURT DECISIONS
In Minnesota v. Carter4 Officer James Thielen approached the window
of a ground-floor apartment and peeked through a gap in the closed blinds to
investigate a tip from an informant that three individuals were bagging
cocaine in the apartment. 5 He observed the individuals bagging the cocaine
and notified headquarters, where officers began preparing affidavits for a
search warrant.' 6 When two of the individuals, Carter and Johns, left the
apartment building, entered a car, and started to leave, they were arrested."
Based on evidence discovered in the vehicle, and in the apartment during a
search pursuant to a warrant issued after the vehicle search, they were
charged with various controlled substance offenses.' 8
12. State v. Carter, 569N.W.2d 169,175 (Minn. 1997) (quoting Minnesota v. Olson, 495 U.S. 91,98 (1990)) [hereinaf-
ter in footnotes as Carter 11].
13. 569 N.W.2d 169 (Minn. 1997).
14. 119 S. Ct. 469 (1998).





Following the arrests, the police learned that Carter and Johns were
from Chicago, and "had come to the apartment for the sole purpose of pack-
aging the cocaine."' 19 They had never been to the apartment before and
stayed in the apartment for approximately two and a half hours. 20 They had
given the lessee one-eighth of an ounce of cocaine in exchange for the use of
the apartment. 21
Carter and Johns moved to suppress all evidence discovered in the
apartment and the car, as well as statements they made, arguing that Officer
Thielen's initial observation of their activities in the apartment was an
unreasonable search in violation of the Fourth Amendment. 22 The trial court
denied the motion, holding that the defendants had presented no evidence to
establish "standing" to contest the search, and that as short duration callers
they lacked the reasonable expectation of privacy necessary to challenge the
officer's conduct. 23 The trial court also ruled the officer's conduct did not
constitute a search. 24
Following the suppression motion, the defendants proceeded with sepa-
rate counsel. After each was convicted, they pressed separate appeals.
Carter's appeal was decided first. In that case, the Minnesota Court of
Appeals agreed with the trial court.25 The appeals court noted that a defen-
dant was required to show more than he was simply "legitimately on the pre-
mises. '26 The court noted that staying overnight was sufficient to create a
reasonable expectation of privacy under Minnesota v. Olson,27 but such an
expectation could also be established by guests who did not stay overnight.21
However, the court found Carter's presence fell short of what was required;
the court refused to accept Carter's assertion that he was a social guest, rul-
ing that such a claim was "inconsistent with the only evidence concerning
his stay in the apartment, which indicates that he used it for a business pur-
pose--to package drugs." 29 This evidence "defeat[ed] the 'legitimate expec-
tation of privacy' standard" and meant the defendant's presence at the
apartment was insufficient to give him standing.30
When the court decided Johns' appeal, it noted its decision in Carter
and declined to address Johns' "standing" claim. Deciding the case on the
merits, the court ruled Officer Thielen "acted reasonably by walking up to
the window and making the initial glance inside and by continuing to look in
18. See Minmesota v. Carter, 119 S. Ct. 469, 471-72 (1998).
19. ld. at 471.
20. See id
21. Seeid at 471-72.
22. See Carter 111, 119 S. Ct. at 4721
23. See id. at 472.
24. See iU
25. See State v. Carter 545 N.W2d 695 (Minn CL App. 1996) [hereinafter in footnotes as Carter !].
26. Id. at 697 (citing Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 142 (1978)). For a discussion of the Rakas decision, see infra
notes 134-58 and accompanying text.
27. 495 U.S. 91 (1990).






the window in an attempt to corroborate the informant's story."31
On appeal, the Minnesota Supreme Court treated the cases as compan-
ion cases and reversed the Court of Appeals in both,32 holding the defen-
dants had standing to challenge the legality of Officer Thielen's actions and
that his observation rose to the level of a search that was unreasonable under
the state and federal constitutions.3 3 As to the first issue, under the heading
of "Standing," the Minnesota court recognized that a defendant must allege
a violation of his individual rights, rather than the rights of a third party.
34
Quoting Rakas v. Illinois, 3 5 the court explained
the question turns on a "determination of whether the disputed
search. . . has infringed an interest of the defendant which the
Fourth Amendment was designed to protect." Such an interest
exists when "the person who claims the protection of the Amend-
ment has a legitimate expectation of privacy in the invaded
place. '3 6
The court then turned to the question before it: whether the defendants had a
legitimate expectation of privacy in the apartment they were visiting.
31
The Minnesota court answered the question by applying the test from
Justice Harlan's concurrence in Katz v. United States:38 a defendant has a
legitimate expectation of privacy when his or her subjective expectation of
privacy is "'one that society is prepared to recognize as reasonable."' 39 The
court easily found the defendants had a subjective expectation of privacy by
virtue of being inside the apartment of an acquaintance with the doors shut
and the blinds drawn. As usual, the more difficult question Was whether the
defendants' expectation was the type society is prepared to recognize as rea-
sonable. On that issue, the court stated that a close reading of Olson
revealed
the Supreme Court does not require a person to establish his or her
status as either a guest or an overnight guest before that person can
prove a legitimate expectation of privacy in a location that is
31. State v. Johns, No. C9-95-1765 1996 Min. App. LEXIS 685, at *3-*4 (Minn. Ct App. June 11, 1996), revd. 569
N.W.2d 180 (Minn. 1998).
32. See State v. Carter, 569 N.W.2d 169 (Mim 1997), rev'4t 119 S. Ct 469 (1998).,See also State v. Johm, 569 N.W.2d
180 (Mina 1997), rev'd, 119 S. CL 469 (1998). The Minnesota Supreme Court issued a full opinion in Carter I1, and in Johns
simply noted that "[t]he facts and legal issues are identical in both cases" and that "[b]ased on our reasoning in the conpanion
case of State v. Carter, the decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed" Johns, 569 N.W.2d at 181.
33. See Carter 11, 569 N.W.2d at 171.
34. See id. at 174 (citing Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 261 (1960)). For a discussion of Jones, see infra notes
117-25 and accompanying text.
35. 439 U.S. 128 (1978).
36. Carter Il, 569 N.W.2d at 174 (quoting Rakas, 439 U.S. at 140,143).
37. See id.
38. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
39. Carter1i. 569N.W.2d at 174 (quoting Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan. J., concurring)). For
a discussion ofthe Katr decision, see infra notes 126-32 and accompanying text.
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searched. Instead, the person must establish only that under the
totality of the circumstances, the person's subjective expectation
was the type of expectation that "society is prepared to recognize
as 'reasonable. '4
The court read Olson as recognizing an expectation of privacy as legitimate
not merely because the defendant was a guest, but because the defendant's
status as a guest "was the type of longstanding social custom that serves
functions recognized as valuable by society."'41  Looking to the stipulated
facts--that the apartment's leaseholder allowed the defendants into her apart-
ment to package cocaine in exchange for one-eighth ounce of cocaine, that
the leaseholder and the defendants worked together to package the cocaine,
that the defendants remained inside the apartment for two and a half hours,
and that one defendant wore bedroom slippers while inside the apartment 42--
the court held that although these facts probably failed to establish the
defendants as "guest[s]" of the lessee, they were nevertheless sufficient to
prove that the defendants possessed a legitimate expectation of privacy in
the apartment.
43
This conclusion was based largely on the fact that the defendants were
in the apartment with permission and were engaged in a common task with
the lessee. To the Minnesota Supreme Court, it was irrelevant whether the
defendants were classified as visitors, invitees, or business partners of the
lessee. The label that accurately defined the relationship was not determina-
tive. Instead, the court focused on whether the relationship was of the type
society recognized as valuable. And while the court realized "society does
not recognize as valuable the task of bagging cocaine," it nevertheless con-
cluded "society does recognize as valuable the right of property owners or
leaseholders to invite persons into the privacy of their homes to conduct a
common task, be it legal or illegal activity. ' 44 Therefore, the court held that
the defendants had "standing" to challenge Officer Thielen's actions.45 The
State sought review in the United States Supreme Court, which agreed to
hear the case. 46
40. Carter 11, 569 N.W.2d at 175 (quoting Katz, 389 U.S. at 361).
41. Id.
4Z See id at n.7. The court was careful to make clear that its decision did not tum on the type of footwear the defen-
dant was wearing.
43. See id at176.
44. Carter lI. 569 N.W.2d at 176.
45. See id.
46. SeeMirmeaotav. Carter, ll S. Ct. 1183 (1998).
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Il. MINNESOTA V CARTER. 47 THE UNITED STATES SUPREME
COURT DECISION
A. TheBriefs
In the United States Supreme Court, all the parties agreed that the pre-
cise issue facing the Court was whether the defendants could demonstrate
they enjoyed a reasonable expectation of privacy in the apartment, and that
the determination of this issue depended on whether the subjective expecta-
tion of privacy the defendants arguably harbored was one society was will-
ing to recognize as reasonable or legitimate.
L The State's Argument
The State argued the Court should make this determination by applying
"a balancing test based on the totality of the circumstances. '48 In the State's
view, this analysis should emphasize the defendants' lack of connection to
the place searched and the illegal nature of the activities conducted there to
deny the defendants the ability to challenge the police conduct:
In the case at hand, Carter and Johns have not presented any evi-
dence of ownership or other property interest in the apartment.
[Defendants] have not presented any evidence demonstrating any
prior contact with the apartment or that they had spent consider-
able time at the apartment. Carter and Johns have not presented
any evidence that they had personal effects within the apartment or
any evidence regarding their ability to control access to the apart-
ment. Most importantly, Carter and Johns have not demonstrated
that the activities that they were engaged in were intended to be
protected by the Fourth Amendment.4
9
According to the State, the Minnesota Supreme Court's conclusion that
"society does recognize as valuable the right of property owners or lease-
holders to invite persons into the privacy of their homes to conduct a com-
mon task, be it legal or illegal activity" overemphasized the relationship of
the defendants to the leaseholder,5° rather than the property, and underem-
phasized the illegal nature of the activities in which they were engaged.5' If
allowed to stand, the State argued, the Minnesota court's decision "will let a
guest or invitee stand in the same shoes as the owner or leaseholder of the
property for purposes of determining whether the guest or invitee has stand-
47. 119 S. Ct 469 (1998).
48. Petitioner's Brief at 14, Minnesota v. Carter, 119 S. CL. 469(1998) (No. 97-1147).
49. Id. at 15-16.
50. Id. at 11 (quoting State v. Carter, 569 N.W.2d 169, 176 (1997)). This is the interpersonal privacy that several con-




ing to challenge a search under the Fourth Amendment. 5 2  The result,
according to the State, would be that all that "will be necessary for a defen-
dant to demonstrate is that he is present at the time of the search and
engaged in a common task with the property possessor"--a result much too
close to the "legitimately on the premises" standard rejected by Rakas v. Illi-
nois.53 The State agreed with Justice White's conclusion in Minnesota v.
Olson that "to hold that an overnight guest has a legitimate expectation of
privacy in his host's home merely recognizes the everyday expectations of
privacy that we all share,"54 and argued this analysis requires courts to
examine "the nature and purpose for a person's presence" in another's
dwelling in determining the reasonableness of a defendant's privacy interest
under the Fourth Amendment.5 The State argued that the Minnesota Court
had "totally ignored this important analysis" in reaching the "absurd conclu-
sion" that society would recognize as important a person's interest in engag-
ing in an unlawful activity in the premises of another.
56
2. The Defendants'Argument
The defendants agreed they needed to show a subjective expectation of
privacy and that the expectation was reasonable in light of "'longstanding
social custom[s] that serve functions recognized as reasonable by soci-
ety.' 57 They argued the State had waived any argument that the defendants
did not have a subjective expectation of privacy and, in the alternative, that
the defendants had clearly demonstrated a subjective expectation of pri-
vacy.5" As to the second part of the inquiry, the defendants stated that the
"history, purpose, and application of the Fourth Amendment by [the United
States Supreme] Court establish that [defendants] had a legitimate expecta-
tion of privacy in a home in which they were social guests."5 9 The defen-
dants refuted the State's contention that their expectations of privacy could
not be legitimate because they were engaged in an unlawful activity by
explaining that "[t]he makers of the Constitution were fully aware that the
Fourth Amendment would protect all citizens, even those who might be
engaged in illegal activities such as the possession of contraband or smug-
gled goods.'"60 The defendants argued that precedent supported the Minne-
sota Supreme Court's conclusion that they "had a legitimate expectation of
privacy as social guests in another person's home." 61 They emphasized the
52 Petitioners Brief at 1I, Carter ll (No. 97-1147).
53. 439 U.S. 128 (1978). See also Petitioner's Brief at 11, Carter III (No. 97-1147).
54. Petitioner's Brief at 11, Carter III (No. 97-1147) (quoting Minnesota v. Olson, 495 U.S. 91, 98 (1990)). For a dis-
cussion of Olson, see ii~rf notes 159-67 and accompanying text
55. Petitioner's Brief at 18-19. Carter III (No. 97-1147).
56. Id. at 19.
57. Respondents' Brief at 6-7, Carterll (No. 97-1147) (quoting Olson, 495 U.S. at 98).
58. See id. at 7. Defendants argued the State had waived any claim that the defendants lacked a subjective expectation
of privacy by failing to assert such a claim in the Minnesota Courts or in the State's petition for certiorari. See generally iU
59. Id. atlO.
60. Respondent's Brief at 13-14, Carter ll (No. 97-1147).
61. Id. at 14 (citing Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967); Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128 (1978); Olson, 495 U.S.
[Vol. 22:501
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special protections afforded the home and relied on Olson as extending the
protections to house guests of homeowners. 2 The defendants argued that
the social customs and norms recognized in Olson that led to protection for
overnight guests were equally applicable to shorter term guests.63
3. Amicus Briefs
The United States, in an amicus brief, argued that "invitees other than
overnight guests" are "more similarly situated to a person who is simply
legitimately on the premises,"6 the standard rejected in Rakas, and do not
have an expectation of privacy that society is willing to recognize as legiti-
mate. The government distinguished non-overnight guests because they
generally are not given a substantial "measure of control over the premises"
and normally do not harbor any expectations that the host will exclude oth-
ers on the guest's behalf 6 In the case before the Court, the government
accused the Minnesota Supreme Court of assessing the value of the relation-
ship between the defendants and the lessee "at so high a level of generality
that its conclusions were incongruous." 6
The American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) filed an amicus brief in
support of the Minnesota Supreme Court's ruling.67 The ACLU argued there
was no basis for a bright line rule denying non-overnight guests an expecta-
tion of privacy in their host's home.6 The ACLU brief pointed to historical
evidence supporting the conclusion that "the practice of inviting guests or
visitors into a home was an established social custom by the time the Fourth
Amendment was ratified. '69 This justified the conclusion that guests and
invitees have a legitimate expectation of privacy in the home of their hosts,
an expectation that can not be defeated simply by a showing that they were
engaging in illegal activity.70
B. OralArguments
At oral argument, the Justices struggled to find an appropriate place to
draw a line among visitors to a home. There seemed to be agreement that
the distinction could not turn on the legality of the activity being engaged in,
although the State of Minnesota insisted it should be a factor.7 The State
argued for a totality of the circumstances, multi-factor approach,72 but the
62. See id at 18 (citing Olhon. 495 U.S. at 98-99).
63. See id at 20-21.
64. Brief for the United States at16, Carter III (No. 97-1147).
65. Id. at 17 (quoting Olson, 495 U.S. at 99).
66. Id. at 21. The government recognized the importance of "framing." For a discussion of the concept of "framing,"
see infra notes 211-21 and accompanying text
67. See Brief for the American Civil Liberties Union, the Minnesota Civil Liberties Union, and the National Associa-
tion of Criminal Defense Lawyers at 16, Carter III (No. 97-1147).
68. See id
69. Id. at 8.
70. See id at 13-16.
71. See Transcript of Oral Argument at 7.9, Carter III (No. 97-1147).
72. See id at 7.
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Justices seemed uneasy with such an ambiguous test." The Solicitor Gen-
eral retreated from the rule he had proposed in his brief drawing a bright line
at overnight guests, and suggested instead a "functional equivalent of a
member of the household test," based on the frequency of visits and the level
of control over the premises.74 The Justices also explored a suggestion by
Justice O'Connor that the distinction should be business invitees versus
social guests." The Justices seemed to want to provide protection for lunch
visitors and poker-playing friends, but not the pizza delivery person, appli-
ance repair person, or the Avon lady. Defendants' counsel appeared to agree
with those conclusions, but could not suggest an easy standard by which to
categorize the different individuals.
76
C. The Decision
1. The Majority Opinion - Chief Justice Rehnquist
Chief Justice Rehnquist delivered the opinion of the Court, which was
joined by Justices O'Connor, Scalia, Thomas, and Kennedy." The opinion
did not draw any of the lines suggested in the briefs or at oral argument and
provided very little guidance for future cases.7" After setting forth the facts,
the Court stated that the question before it was a matter of substantive
Fourth Amendment law rather than an issue of "standing" as it had been
analyzed by the Minnesota Supreme Court.79 The Court emphasized that the
Fourth Amendment protection against unreasonable searches and seizures is
a personal right, and reaffirmed the standard of Rakas, that the "'capacity to
claim the protection of the Fourth Amendment depends ... upon whether
the person who claims the protection of the Amendment has a legitimate
expectation of privacy in the invaded place.' 80
The Court noted that the text of the Amendment "suggests that its pro-
tections extend only to people in 'their' houses," a cause taken up with more
vigor by Justice Scalia in his concurrence, 81 but went on to note that the
Court had held that "in some circumstances a person may have a legitimate
expectation of privacy in the house of someone else."8 2 The Court cited
Olson as an example, and explained that by holding "that an overnight guest
had the sort of expectation of privacy that the Fourth Amendment pro-
73. See, e.g., id. at 10 (I find the totality of the circumstances test pretty vague"); id at 18 ("Well, it seems to me that
what you're suggesting is what we might call a multifactor test, and it may be almost impossible to avoid it. . , ."); Transcript of
Oral Argument at 46-47, Carter 111 (No. 97-1147) ("[B]ut police officers, as Justice Brayer indicated, have to have some kind of
clear lines to follow, and so the totality ofthe circumstances doesn't work very well").
74. Id. at 21-22.
75. See id at 18-19.
76. Se id at 55.
77. Se Carter!!l, 119 S. Ct. at 471.
78. See generally it
79. See id at 472 (citingRakas, 439 U.S. at 139-40).
80. Id. at 473 (quoting Rakas, 439 U.S. at 143).
81. Carter III, 119 S. Ct. at 474-75 (Scalia, J., concurring). For a discussion of Justice Scalia's concurring opinion, see
inufr notes 224-38 and accompanying text
82. Carter!!, 119 S. CL at 473.
[Vol. 22:50-1
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tects,"83 the Court was simply recognizing "'the everyday expectations of
privacy that we all share.'" 84 The Court quoted Olson for the proposition
that:
[s]taying overnight in another's home is a long-standing social
custom that serves functions recognized as valuable by society...
. From the overnight guest's perspective, he seeks shelter in
another's home precisely because it provides him with privacy, a
place where he and his possessions will not be disturbed by any-
one but his host and those his host allows inside."5
The Court contrasted the status of an overnight guest with someone who "is
merely present with the consent of the householder," citing the Rakas
Court's express repudiation of the Jones v. United States86 standard, which
permitted 'anyone legitimately on the premises where a search occurs' to
challenge its validity. The Court noted that the defendants "were obviously
not overnight guests, but were essentially present for a business transaction
and were only in the home a matter of hours," that there was "no suggestion
that they had a previous relationship with [the lessee], or that there was any
other purpose to their visit," "nor was there anything similar to the overnight
guest relationship in Olson to suggest a degree of acceptance into the house-
hold."88 Chief Justice Rehnquist characterized the apartment as "simply a
place [for these defendants] to do business."8 9 While not going so far as to
draw a line between social or overnight guests and business invitees, the
Court noted that "[p]roperty used for commercial purposes is treated differ-
ently for Fourth Amendment purposes than residential property."90 The
Court cited New York v. Burger9' for the proposition that "' [an expectation
of privacy in commercial premises . . . is different from, and indeed less
than, a similar expectation in an individual's home.'"92
Nevertheless, the Court resisted drawing a bright line at business invi-
tees. Instead, Chief Justice Rehnquist simply stated that the overnight guest
in Olson and someone merely legitimately on the premises represented dif-
ferent ends of the expectation of privacy spectrum, and that "the present case
is obviously somewhere in between," before explaining that the "purely
commercial nature of the transaction ... the relatively short period of time
on the premises, and the lack of any previous connection between [defen-
83. Id.
84. Id. at 473 (quoting Olson, 495 U.S. at 98).
85. Id. (quoting Olson, 495 U.S. at 98-99).
86. 362 U.S. 257 (1960). See also Carterlll, 119 S. CL at 473.
87. CarterIll, 119 S. CL at 473 (citing Rakas, 439 US. 128).
88. Id.
89. Id. at 474.
90. Id.
91. 482 U.S. 691 (1987).
92. Carter 111. 119 S. CL at 474 (quoting New York v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691, 700 (1987)).
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dants] and the householder, all lead us to conclude that [defendants'] situa-
tion is closer to that of one simply permitted on the premises." 93
This "holding" leaves future defendants to wonder how much of a non-
commercial nature their visit to another's home must involve, how long they
must stay, and what previous connections they must have with the house-
holder if they are to claim the protection of the Fourth Amendment. The
correct answer--but one that may very well get lost--is that almost any visi-
tor with a noncommercial purpose can claim the protection of the Fourth
Amendment. For if the defendants were social guests, the majority would
have lost a vote, and the four Justices who were willing to extend the protec-
tion even to the defendants in this case would have gained a fifth vote.
Based on the "swing vote" of Justice Kennedy, a line has been drawn
between social guests and business invitees. This raises two questions: will
the line be noticed and followed, and does it make any sense?
2. The "Hidden Holding"
The five votes in favor of granting an expectation of privacy for virtu-
ally all social guests come from the dissenting opinion of Justice Ginsburg, 94
in which Justices Stevens and Souter joined, the opinion of Justice Breyer,95
concurring in the judgment, and Justice Kennedy's concurring opinion. 96
a. Justice Ginsburg
In the first paragraph of her opinion, Justice Ginsburg explained her
view that "when a homeowner or lessor 97 personally invites a guest into her
home to share in a common endeavor, whether it be for conversation, to
engage in leisure activities, or for business purposes licit or illicit, that guest
should share his host's shelter against unreasonable searches or seizures. '98
Justice Ginsburg made it clear that she was not advocating reviving the
"legitimately on the premises" test of Jones,99 nor would her rule permit "a
casual visitor who has never seen, or been permitted to visit, the basement of
another's house to object to a search of the basement if the visitor happened
to be in the kitchen of the house at the time of the search"'1'| Justice Gins-
burg also stressed that she was addressing "only the case of the homeowner
who chooses to share the privacy of her home and her company with a guest,
and would not reach classroom hypotheticals like the milkman or pizza
deliverer." 0'
93. Id.
94. See itt at 481 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
95. See id. at 480 (Breyer, J., concurring).
96. Carter Ill, 119 S. Ct. at 478 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
97 Justice Ginsburg apparently meant "lessee," prestuably intending to address the particular situation before the
Court
98. See Carter III, 119S. Ct. at 481.
99. Id. (quoting Jones, 362 U.S. at 267).
10. Id. (quotingRaras, 439U.S. at 142).
101. Id. at 481-82.
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To Justice Ginsburg, the analysis was relatively simple: "Through the
host's invitation, the guest gains a reasonable expectation of privacy in the
home."'102 Olson had recognized this in the case of an overnight guest and
"[t]he logic of that decision extends to shorter term guests as well."'01 3 Jus-
tice Ginsburg recognized that "[v]isiting the home of a friend, relative, or
business associate, whatever the time of day, 'serves functions recognized as
valuable by society," '104 and that "[o]ne need not remain overnight to antici-
pate privacy in another's home."' 15 To Justice Ginsburg, "when a home-
owner chooses to share the privacy of her home and her company with a
short-term guest," both the "host and guest 'have exhibited an actual (sub-
jective) expectation of privacy' that 'society is prepared to recognize as rea-
sonable." '106 Olson taught that the illegality of the host-guest conduct is
irrelevant'017 and Katz provided the benchmark for extending protection in
the case of the defendants in Carter: "I do not agree that we have a more rea-
sonable expectation of privacy when we place a business call to a person's
home from a public telephone booth on the side of the street... than when
we actually enter that person's premises to engage in a common
endeavor."' 08
b. Justices Breyer and Kennedy
The two additional votes in favor of a general rule extending an expec-
tation of privacy to social guests came from Justice Breyer and Justice
Kennedy. In the first sentence of his opinion, Justice Breyer stated that he
"agree[d] with Justice Ginsburg that the [defendants] can claim the Fourth
Amendment's protection," 09 but concurred in the judgment because he did
not believe the officer's conduct amounted to a search. Justice Kennedy
stated in his opinion that "almost all social guests have a legitimate expecta-
tion of privacy, and hence protection against unreasonable searches, in their
host's home."" 0 He joined the majority opinion because he was unwilling to
characterize the defendants in Carter as guests. Justice Kennedy pointed out
that the defendants had established "nothing more than a fleeting and insub-
stantial connection" with the owner's home, and used it "simply as a conve-
nient processing station, their purpose involving nothing more than the
mechanical act of chopping and packing a substance for distribution.""' He
stressed that the record contained no evidence that the defendants had
engaged in confidential communications with the lessee about their transac-
102. Carter 1,1119 S. CL at 482.
103. Id. (citing OLson. 495 U.S. at 91). Justice Ginsburg extended this protection as much to protect the privacy of the
owner as of the guest.
104. Id. (quoting Olson. 495 U.S. at 98).
105. Id.
106. Carter 111, 119 S. Ct. at 482-83 (quoting Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring)).
107. See id at 483 (citing Olson, 495 U.S. at 93-94).
108. Id. at 483-84 (citing Katz, 389 U.S. at 353).
109. Id. at 480 (Breyer, J., concurring).
110. Carter1ll, 119 S. Ct. at 478 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
Ill. ld. at 479.
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tion or that they had been to the apartment previously. He also noted they
left the apartment even before their arrest and that the Minnesota Supreme
Court had acknowledged the defendants "could not be fairly characterized
as [the lessee's] 'guests." 11 2 In most other cases, Justice Kennedy appar-
ently would be willing to join the four other Justices and recognize short
term visitors as guests and extend to them a reasonable expectation of pri-
vacy." 3 However, this "hidden holding" of Carter is unlikely to be recog-
nized by lower courts, and short term guests likely will not fare well in their
attempts to claim a reasonable expectation of privacy in their host's home.
IV. THE SUPREME COURT'S "STANDING" JURISPRUDENCE
Current United States Supreme Court "standing" law begins with the
Court's decision in Rakas v. Illinois,114 but traces its origins to the Court's
earlier decision in Katz v. United States, "I and is influenced by an even ear-
lier case, Jones v. United States."
6
A. Jones v. United States
In Jones federal officers executing a search warrant discovered narcot-
ics and narcotics paraphernalia in a bird's nest in an awning just outside a
window of the apartment in which Jones was staying." 7 When Jones moved
to suppress the evidence, the government challenged his standing on the
basis that he had not claimed ownership of the seized items, nor did he have
"an interest in the apartment greater than that of an 'invitee or guest.' 118
Jones testified "that his home was elsewhere, that he paid nothing for the use
of the apartment, that [the lessee] had let him use it 'as a friend,"' that he had
a suit and shirt at the apartment, and "that he had slept there 'maybe a
night.' 119 The lessee had been away for about five days at the time of the
search.12
0
The Supreme Court found that Jones had standing on two grounds.
First, the Court created a rule of "automatic standing" for individuals
charged with a possessory offense, 121 a rule it later repudiated in United
States v. Salvucci.122 In addition, the Court held that Jones "had a sufficient
interest in the premises to establish him as a 'person aggrieved' by the
search."' 123 Recognizing that lower courts generally had denied standing to
112. Id. (citii* Carter I. 569N.W.2d at 175-76).
113. See id
114. 439U.S. 128 (1978).
115. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
116. 362 U.S. 257 (1960).
117. See Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 258-59 (1960).
118. Id. at 259.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. See Jones, 362 U.S. at 264.
122. 448 U.S. 83 (1980).
123. Jones, 362 U.S. at 265.
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guests and invitees, the Court rejected basing standing decisions on "subtle
distinctions" from the common law of property, "such as those between 'les-
see,' 'licensee,' 'invitee' and 'guest." '124 Instead, the Court ruled "that any-
one legitimately on the premises where a search occurs may challenge its
legality."' 2
B. Katz v. United States
26
Seven years later, the Court decided Katz. The issue in that case was
whether a search had occurred, rather than whether Mr. Katz had "standing"
to contest the search. However, when the Court later eliminated "standing"
as a separate inquiry in Rakas, it adopted the "reasonable expectation of pri-
vacy" standard of Katz as the standard for determining who may challenge
police conduct--the old "standing" inquiry.
Katz held that police conduct in intercepting Mr. Katz's phone conver-
sation with his bookmaker by placing a listening device atop a phone booth
constituted a search under the Fourth Amendment. 127 In doing so, Katz
changed the inquiry concerning whether a search occurred from a question
of property interests to a question of privacy. Best known for the "notori-
ously unhelpful"'28 admonition that the Fourth Amendment "protects peo-
ple, not places,"' 29 Katz established that "the reach of [the Fourth]
Amendment cannot turn upon the presence or absence of a physical intru-
sion into any given enclosure."' 130 The Court held that the
Government activities in electronically listening to and recording
the petitioner's words violated the privacy upon which he justifi-
ably relied while using the telephone booth and thus constituted a
"search and seizure" within the meaning of the Fourth Amend-
ment. The fact that the electronic device employed to achieve that
end did not happen to penetrate the wall of the booth can have no
constitutional significance. 
31
In later cases, the United States Supreme Court adopted the test set
forth in Justice Harlan's concurrence to determine whether a search had
occurred. Justice Harlan articulated the rule as imposing a "twofold require-
ment" that a person demonstrate "an actual (subjective) expectation of pri-
vacy and.., that the expectation be one that society is prepared to recognize
as 'reasonable. '132 When the Rakas Court changed the rules of standing, it
124. Id. at 266.
125. d. at 267.
126. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
127. See ic at 359.
128. CarterIII, 119 S. CL at 471 (Scalia, J., concuring) (citing Kat. 389 U.S. at 347).
129. Ka, 389 U.S. at 351.
130. 1 at353.
131. Id.
132. Id. at 360-61 (Harlan, J., concurring).
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brought Katz--not a "standing" case--to center stage.
C. Rakas v. Illinois33
In Rakas a police officer received a report of a robbery of a clothing
store and stopped a car which he thought might be the getaway car.134 A
search of the car revealed a box of rifle shells in the locked glove compart-
ment and a sawed-off rifle under the front seat.13 Two passengers in the
auto who were charged with the crime moved to suppress the evidence dis-
covered during the search of the car.136 When Rakas was heard, Jones was
the controlling law. Thus, the defendants could demonstrate "standing" to
challenge a search either through automatic standing, if they were charged
with a possessory offense, or by demonstrating that they were "legitimately
on the premises" that had been searched. 137 The defendants in Rakas were
not charged with a possessory offense, and therefore relied on the fact that
they were "legitimately on the premises" that had been searched. 138 The first
thing the Rakas Court did, however, was change the rules.
After reaffirming the holding of Jones and other cases that "'Fourth
Amendment rights are personal rights that may not be asserted vicari-
ously," 1 39 the Court considered whether "it serves any useful analytical pur-
pose to consider this principle a matter of standing, distinct from the merits
of a defendant's Fourth Amendment claim."' 140 It decided that "the better
analysis forthrightly focuses on the extent of a particular defendant's rights
under the Fourth Amendment, rather than on any theoretically separate, but
invariably intertwined concept of standing.' 141  The Court went on to
explain the import of its new approach:
Analyzed in these terms, the question is whether the challenged
search or seizure violated the Fourth Amendment rights of a crim-
inal defendant who seeks to exclude the evidence obtained during
it. That inquiry in turn requires a determination of whether the
disputed search and seizure has infringed an interest of the defen-
dant which the Fourth Amendment was designed to protect. 142
This approach naturally led the Court to the Katz "legitimate expecta-
tion of privacy" test 43 to make this determination. Although many com-
133. 439U.S. 128(1978).
134. Se id at l30.
135. Se: id
136. See id
137. For a disesion of "standing" under Jones, see supra notes 118-25 and accompanying text.
138. See Rakas, 439 U.S. at 132.
139. Id. at 133-34 (quoting Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165, 174 (1969)).
140. Id. at 138-39.
141. Id. at 139.
142. Rakas, 439 U.S. at 140.
143. Id. at 143. The Court stated only that Katz "provides guidance in defining the scope of the interes(protected by the
Fourth Amendment," but in fact, utilized the legitimate expectation of privacy test.
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mentators144 have complained that dropping the "standing" rubric simply
causes unnecessary confusion, the idea that a citizen's ability to challenge a
search should be based on that individual's reasonable expectations of pri-
vacy has met with wide acceptance. The disagreement has centered on the
determination that the defendants in Rakas--the passengers in the car--had
no such expectation of privacy.
The Rakas Court determined that once the inquiry was focused on the
substantive issue of whether a particular individual's reasonable expectation
of privacy had been invaded, the "legitimately on the premises" test of Jones
could no longer control. 145 That test would permit "casual visitors" with no
connection to the premises, and no expectation of privacy there, to challenge
the conduct of the police. 146  Instead, courts should determine whether the
individuals seeking to challenge the search had a reasonable expectation of
privacy. In perhaps the most criticized portion of the opinion, the Court
declared that the defendants in Rakas failed this test because they "asserted
neither a property nor a possessory interest in the automobile, nor an interest
in the property seized.' 14' Of course, the defendants had no reason to do so,,
since the controlling standard when their case was heard was simply
whether they were legitimately on the premises. Nevertheless, the Court
rejected the defendant's request to have the case remanded to provide them
the opportunity to make such a showing. 148 The Court's refusal to remand
had two effects. First, it opened the Court to scathing criticism from the dis-
sent and commentators. 149 More importantly, it led courts to read Rakas as
adopting a bright line rule that passengers in cars have no legitimate expec-
tations of privacy.
Justice White wrote a dissenting opinion, which was joined by three
other Justices.' s He accused the majority of returning to the pre-Katz stan-
dard that protected property, not privacy.' Justice White reminded the
majority that the "'primary object of the Fourth Amendment [is]... the pro-
tection of privacy. '152 To Justice White, it was important, perhaps conclu-
sive, that the defendants "were in a private place with the permission of the
owner."' 53 He found it hard to understand the majority view that this fact
was not sufficient to establish a legitimate expectation of privacy, and criti-
144. See, e.g., Albert W. Alchuler, InterpersonalPrivacy and the Fourth Amendment, 1983 N. ILL. U. L. REv. I (1983);
Thomas K. Clancy, What Does the Fourth Amendment Protect: Property Privacy, or Security?, 33 WAKE FOREST L. Rv. 307
(1998); Mary I. Coombs, Shared Privacy and the Fourth Amendment, or the Rights of Relationships, 75 CAL. L. REv. 1593
(1987); Richard A. Williamson, Fourth Amendment Standing and Expectations of Privacy: Rakas v. Illinois and New Directions
for Some Old Concepts, 31 U. FLA. L. REV. 831 (1979); Yeager, supra note 8.
145. See Rakas, 439 U.S. at 142.
146. See id
147. Id. at 148.
148. See id. at 130 l. Such a ahowing may have been possible aimee the ex-wife of one of the passenger was the
owner and driver of the car. In Carter, one defendant has now made a similar claim, that the lessee was his girlfriend.
149. See Alchuler, supro note 144, at 13; Coombs, supra note 144, at 1629n.161.
150. See Rakas, 439 U.S. at 156 (White, J., dissenting). Justice White was joined by Justices Brerma, Marshall, and
Stevens. See id.
151. See id at 156-57.
152. Id. at 160 (quoting Cardwell v. Lewis, 417 U.S. 583, 589 (1974)).
153. Id. at 164-65 (White, J., dissenting).
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cized the majority for failing to explain what would be sufficient. In Justice
White's view, "it is hard to imagine anything short of a property interest that
would satisfy the majority." '154 He wondered "how is the Court able to avoid
answering the question why presence in a private place with the owner's
permission is insufficient?"'55 He went on to state that
[t]he Court's holding is contrary not only to our past decisions and
the logic of the Fourth Amendment but also to the everyday expec-
tations of privacy that we all share .... If the owner of the car had
not only invited petitioners to join her but had said to them, "I give
you a temporary possessory interest in my vehicle so that you will
share the right to privacy that the Supreme Court says that I own,"
then apparently the majority would reverse. But people seldom
say such things, though they may mean their invitation to encom-
pass them if only they had thought of the problem. 1
56
Justice White was concerned not only that the Court's holding failed to
adequately address the interests the Fourth Amendment was designed to
protect, but also that it failed to provide law enforcement officials a bright
line rule between the protected and unprotected individuals, and as a result
would "ensnare defendants and police in needless litigation over factors that
should not be determinative of Fourth Amendment rights."'57  Justice
White's fondness for bright lines would play an important role when the
question of legitimate expectations of privacy moved inside the home,
securing Justice White a fifth (sixth, and seventh) vote and the opportunity
to make his views on expectations of privacy the law in Minnesota v.
Olson. 18
D. Minnesota v. Olson'59
In Olson, police officers in search of a suspect in a gas station robbery
154. Rakes, 439 U.S. at 165. Even the Court's attempt to caw a more narrow line--explaning "[t]hat this is not to say
that such visitors could not contest the lawfulness of the seizure of evidence or the search if their own property were seized during
the search"--did not survive long. Two years later, in Rawlings v. Kentsucy, 448 U.S. 98 (1980). the Court ruled that the defendant
could not challenge the search of a purse of a womaan companion, even though the Court assumed the woman had given the defen-
dent permission to store the drugs in her purse, and the defendant claimed that his ownership of the property seized entitled him to
challenge the search. Despite its footnote in Rakes suggesting ownership might make a difference, when faced with a defendant-
owner the Court stated: "While the petitioner's ownership of the drugs is undoubtedly one fact to be considered in this case,
Rakes emphatically rejected the notion that "arcane" concepts of property law ought to control the ability to claim the protection
ofthe Fourth Amendmnent"Rawlings, 448 U.S. at 105-06.
As described by Professor Alschuler
Rakes had emphasized the defendants' failure to allege ownership of the property seized, and it had
said that an owner of property would "in all likelihood" have standing to challenge its search or aei-
zure "by virtue of his] right to exclude." Accordingly, the defendant inRawlings said to the Supreme
Court "I am the owner." And the Court responded, "Mr. Rawlings, don't be arcane."
Alshuler supra note 144, at 15.
155. Rakas, 439 U.S. at 165.
156. Id. at 167.
157. Id. at 168.




and homicide captured the suspect by making a warrantless entry into an
apartmeit where they had probable cause to believe the suspect was stay-
ing.160 On appeal to the United States Supreme Court, the state argued that
Olson did not have a sufficient interest in the apartment to challenge the
search.' 6' The state offered a twelve-factor test to determine whether a
dwelling is a "home" and entitled to protection. 62 Justice White, now writ-
ing for the majority, quickly dismissed the test: "Aside from the fact that it is
based on the mistaken premise that a place must be one's 'home' in order for
one to have a legitimate expectation of privacy there, the State's proposed
test is needlessly complex."' 63 To Justice White, the issue was far simpler:
"We need go no further than to conclude, as we do, that Olson's status as an
overnight guest is alone enough to show that he had an expectation of pri-
vacy in the home that society is prepared to recognize as reasonable."'",
To Justice White, the facts of the case were very similar to those in
Jones, and the distinctions urged by the State--that Olson was never left
alone in the duplex or given a key--were not sufficient to change the
result.165 Instead, Justice White explained, "ftlo hold that an overnight guest
has a legitimate expectation of privacy in his host's home merely recognizes
the everyday expectations of privacy that we all share."'
66
In fact, Justice White viewed Olson as little different from Rakas.
Olson was in a private place with permission of the owner. Therefore, hold-
ing that he enjoyed a legitimate expectation of privacy merely recognized
the "everyday expectations of privacy that we all share, ' the same everyday
expectations that, Justice White believed, demanded a finding that the pas-
sengers in Rakas enjoyed such a right. By emphasizing Olson's status as an
overnight guest -and drawing a bright line in favor of overnight guests, Jus-
tice White avoided the question of whether non-overnight guests enjoyed
such an expectation. Although there can be little doubt that Justice White
believed non-overnight guests enjoyed such an expectation (he thought the
passengers in Rakas did), he likely narrowed the question to overnight
guests in order to achieve the necessary votes to write the majority opinion.
160. 'See id at 93-94.
161. See id at 96.
162. Seeid at96rL4. The twelve factora proposed by the state were:
(1) the visiter has some property rights in the dwelling;
(2) the visitor is related by blood or marriage to the owner or lessor of the dwelling;
(3) the visitor receives mail at the dwelling or has his name on the door;
(4) the visitor has a key to the dwelling;
(5) the visitor maintains a regular or continuous presenee in the dwelling, especially sleeping there
regularly;
(6) the visitor contributes to the upkeep of the dwelling, either monetarily or otherwise;
(7) the visitor has been present at the dwelling for a substantial length of time prior to the arrest;
(8) the visitor stores his clothes or other possessions in the dwelling;
(9) the visitor has been granted by the owner exclusive ue of a particular area of the dwelling;
(10) the visitor has the right to exclude other persons from the dwelling;
(I1) the visitor is allowed to remain in the dwelling when the owner is absent; and
(12) the visitor has taken precautions to develop and maintain his privacy in the dwelling.
163. Olson, 495 U.S. at 96.
164. Id. at 96-97.
165. See id at 97-98.
166. ld at 98.
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The Rakas Court had stated that the result in Rakas--that the passengers had
no legitimate expectation of privacy--would have been the same even "in an
analogous situation in a dwelling place."'167 Justice White needed to prevent
the situation in Olson from being characterized as "Rakas in a dwelling
place." Since the Rakas Court had affirmed the result in Jones granting pro-
tection to an overnight guest, Justice White was able to characterize the situ-
ation of an overnight guest as one that was not analogous to the passengers
in Rakas, leaving the battle over non-overnight guests to another day.
Unfortunately, when that day arrived, Justice White was no longer on the
Court.
V. ANALYSIS
Minnesota v. Carter'68 demonstrates a Court more concerned with lim-
iting the reach of the exclusionary rule than with seriously recognizing citi-
zens' reasonable expectations of privacy and protecting the everyday
expectations that we all share. 169 If the Court had been concerned with hon-
estly and accurately assessing and protecting these expectations, Carter
should have been an easy case to decide in favor of the defendants.
In Rakas v. Illinois170 the Court explained that the Katz v. United
States'' decision is to provide guidance in determining citizens' reasonable
expectations of privacy. 72 But an objective comparison of Katz with Carter
should lead to a result different from the one reached by the Court. Chief
Justice Rehnquist explained that "the purely commercial nature of the trans-
action... the relatively short period of time on the premises, and the lack of
any previous connection between respondents and the householder" all led
the Court to deny a reasonable expectation of privacy. 7 3 But a careful read-
ing of Katz suggests that none of these factors should have prevented a find-
ing that the defendants did have a reasonable expectation of privacy.
In Carter, Chief Justice Rehnquist characterized the apartment as "sim-
ply a place [for these defendants] to do business."' 174 That was also true of
the telephone booth in Katz--it was simply a place for Mr. Katz to do busi-
ness. And, like Carter, the business Mr. Katz engaged in was an illegal
one. 7  Chief Justice Rehnquist explained that "property used for commer-
cial purposes is treated differently for Fourth Amendment purposes" and
quoted New York v. Burger'76 for the proposition that "'[an expectation of
167. Rak. 439 U.S. at 148.
168. 119 S. CL 469 (1998).
169. Justice White made the same observation about the Rakas Court. See Rakes v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 157 (1978)
(White, J., dissenting). See also Coombs, supra note 144, at 1651-52.
170. 439 U.S. 128(1978).
171. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
172. SeeRakas, 439U.S. at 143 (citingKat, 389U.S. 347 (1967)).
173. Carter 11. 119 S. CL at 474.
174. Id.
175. Of course, it could have been more; it could have been a place Mr. Katz chose to make a personal phone call, bit the
same is true of the apartment in Carter--the apartment could have been a place the defendants chose to spend the night.
176. 482U.S. 691 (1987).
[Vol. 22:501
MINNESOTA V. CARTER
privacy in commercial premises... is different from, and indeed less than, a
similar expectation in an individual's home.' 1"" However, Chief Justice
Rehnquist's reliance on Burger is misplaced. Burger addressed the issue of
whether a warrant was needed for an administrative search of a commercial
property. The quoted language refers to the lesser expectation of privacy the
owner enjoys vis-a-vis the government and how this affects the determina-
tion of whether the search is a reasonable one. The question in Carter was
whether the owner had agreed to share her expectation of privacy, whatever
it may have been, with another person; how great that expectation is vis-a-
vis the government is relevant only to the issue of whether government con-
duct intruding on that expectation is reasonable. That is the question the
Court addressed in Burger. Justice White criticized the Court for making the
identical analytical misstep in Rakas,178 when the Court cited the lower
expectation of privacy citizens enjoy in vehicles as a basis to deny any
expectation of privacy for the passengers. 179
The lower expectation of privacy the Court assigns to commercial
property or automobiles should not both reduce the privacy expectations of
the owner and at the same time make it more difficult for -the owner to share
those expectations with another. In fact, arguably the opposite is true. If the
owner enjoys a lower expectation of privacy, the owner might be willing to
share it with others with whom the owner has a less-well-established rela-
tionship. For example, one might agree to share a ride, and their expecta-
tions of privacy, with someone on a long distance automobile trip more
readily than one would invite someone into one's home to share their expec-
tations of privacy.
The commercial aspect of the defendants' relationship to the lessee also
seemed important to Justice Kennedy. It prevented the defendants from
qualifying as social guests and thereby gaining an expectation of privacy
under Justice Kennedy's rule. 180 Justice O'Connor explored the distinction
between business invitees and social guests at oral argument 8' and the State
of Minnesota agreed it was important to draw that line. Although the Court's
opinion did not explicitly adopt this distinction, Justice Kennedy's concern
with labels, contrary to the teachings of the Court's prior decisions, meant
the result in the case turned on a label. Because the defendants could not, in
Justice Kennedy's view, qualify as "guests," they were denied the protection
of the rule he espoused, "that almost all social guests have a legitimate
expectation of privacy, and hence protection against unreasonable searches,
in their host's home.'
182
Chief Justice Rehnquist also pointed to the relatively short period of
177. Carter lll, 119 S. Ct. at 474 (quoting New York v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691, 700(1987)).
178. See Rakas, 439 U.S. at 158 (White, J., dissenting).
179. See id. at 148.
180. Carter I, 119 S. Ct. at 479 (Kennedy, I., concurring).
181. See Transcript of Oral Argument at 18-19, Carter III (No. 97-1147).
182. Carter III, 119 S. Ct at 478 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
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time the defendants spent on the premises and the lack of any previous con-
nection between the defendant and the leaseholder as factors leading the
Court to deny them an expectation of privacy.183 But again, Mr. Katz was in
the phone booth very briefly and with only one purpose--to transact illegal
business. The Katz Court explained that Mr. Katz was entitled to assume his
conversation was private because he "sought to exclude" uninvited ears
when he occupied the booth, shut the door behind him and paid his toll to
place a call. 184 This is precisely what Mr. Carter and Mr. Johns did. They
sought to exclude the uninvited eye'85 by moving inside the apartment, clos-
ing the door and drawing the blinds. The Katz Court obviously, did not
intend to limit its rationale to a phone booth. Instead, the Court analogized
Mr. Katz's circumstances to other situations that seem to answer the ques-
tion in Carter: "No less than an individual in a business office, in a friend's
apartment, or in a taxicab, a person in a telephone booth may rely upon the
protection of the Fourth Amendment."' 186 Chief Justice Rehnquist might
argue the lack of any previous relationship between the defendants and the
lessee prevents them from qualifying under the Katz hypothetical of a per-
son in a friends apartment. But even if the defendants' only relationship
with the lessee was that they paid her (with cocaine) for the use of the apart-
ment, they look very similar to the person who pays to sit in the back of a
taxicab, or pays the phone company to use a phone. The type of currency
involved should not alter the nature of the relationship or diminish the sig-
nificance of the fact that payment was made. In Carter, the Court seemed to
dismiss the idea that a person can buy an expectation of privacy. But the
Katz Court found "paying the toll" a compelling factor in Mr. Katz's situa-
tion.187 It is unlikely the result in Katz would have been different if Mr. Katz
had asked an acquaintance if he could use her phone to make a call, or if he
had paid someone other than the telephone company for the privilege of
using a phone.
The basic flaw in the Court's analysis in Carter is its fear of retreating
to the "legitimately on the premises" test of Jones.1  As a result, the Court
extended the reach of that category of visitors to include too many situa-
tions, or at least to allow too many situations to be tainted by it. The real
concern of the Court in Rakas was to eliminate from the Jones standard
those individuals who did not share in the homeowner's expectation of pri-
vacy--the pizza delivery person or appliance repair person--the same charac-
ters that seemed to concern the Court at oral argument in Carter.189 This
suggests a far more limited role for the "legitimately on the premises" cate-
183. See id at 473-74.
184. KaM, 389 U.S. at 352.
185. The fact that they were unsuccessful does not change the expectation of privacy issue-Mr. Katz was also unsuc-
cessful--although it might have been important in deciding the second issue, which the Court did not reach
186. Kaas 389 U.S. at 352 (emphasis added).
187. See iad.
188. Jones 362 U.S. at 267.
189. See Rakax, 439 U.S. at142.
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gory than the Court has given it.
In Carter, Chief Justice Rehnquist explained that "[i]f we regard the
overnight guest in Minnesota v. Olson as typifying those who may claim the
protection of the Fourth Amendment in the home of another, and one merely
'legitimately on the premises' as typifying those who may not do so, the
present case is obviously somewhere in between."' 19 His "analysis" then
suggests that the categories at either end of this scale extend toward the mid-
dle, with each category capturing a roughly equal share of the variety of sit-
uations that may arise. The Chief Justice denied defendants an expectation
of privacy because their situation was "closer to that of one simply permitted
on the premises."191 This ignores the fact that in many situations, often only
a small step away from the "legitimately on the premises" category, owners
are willing to share the expectation of privacy they enjoy in their home.
In his dissent in Rakas, Justice White pointed out that the majority
apparently would have granted the passengers an expectation of privacy if
the owner of the car had not simply invited the defendants to join her, but
had said to them, "'I give you a temporary possessory interest in my vehicle
so that you will share the right to privacy that the Supreme Court says that I
own."'191 But as Justice White explained, "[p]eople seldom say such things,
though they may mean their invitation to encompass them if only they had
thought of the problem." 193 Rather than mechanically deciding whether a
situation is marginally closer to one end of the "shared expectations of pri-
vacy" scale than the other, the Court should ask whether it has before it a sit-
uation where the owner likely was inviting the guests to share in her
expectations of privacy, even though she did not say so explicitly, because
people seldom do. This was the situation in Carter. Not only did the lessee
grant the defendants permission to use the apartment to engage in an activity
for which they needed privacy, the lessee joined them in their endeavor.
Viewed from the perspective of either the defendants or the lessee, it seems
obvious they had an expectation of privacy and that expectation should have
been protected.
Chief Justice Rehnquist quoted with approval Olson's analysis of the
guest's perspective: "'From the overnight guest's perspective, he seeks shel-
ter in another's home precisely because it provides him with privacy, a place
where he and his possessions will not be disturbed by anyone but his host
and those his host allows inside."' 94 The same can be said for the defen-
dants in Carter. It seems apparent they were seeking privacy when they
made arrangements to use the apartment. Although they were not staying
overnight, the defendants clearly expected that they and their possessions
would not be disturbed by anyone but their host and those their host allowed
190. Carter 111, 119 S. Ct. at 474.
191. Id.
192. Rakas, 439 U.S. at 167 (White, I., dissenting).
193. Id.
194. Carter II, 119 S. Ct. at 473 (quoting Olson. 495 U.S. at 99).
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inside. Especially since the lessee joined the defendants in their task, they
were justified in feeling some assurance that she appreciated the need for
privacy during their stay, and would not allow virtually anyone, and cer-
tainly not the police, into the apartment.
Chief Justice Rehnquist emphasized that while the holding of Jones
remained valid, its statement that 'anyone legitimately on the premises
where a search occurs may challenge its legality""'.9 was expressly repudi-
ated in Rakas.'96 But the Rakas Court's concern was with the casual visitor,
not with every non-overnight visitor. The Rakas Court explained its reluc-
tance to apply the Jones "legitimately on the premises" standard:
For example, applied literally, this statement would permit a
casual visitor who has never seen, or been permitted to visit, the
basement of another's house to object to a search of the basement
if the visitor happened to be in the kitchen of the house at the time
of the search. Likewise, a casual visitor who walks into a house
one minute before a search of the house commences and leaves
one minute after the search ends would be able to contest the legal-
ity of the search. 97
These scenarios do not remotely approach the situation in Carter. Yet
Chief Justice Rehnquist concluded that the defendants' situation was closer
to this scenario than to that of the overnight guest in Olson. The Minnesota
Supreme Court's analysis was more realistic. The Minnesota court recog-
nized that the expectation of privacy of the defendant in Olson was deemed
legitimate because allowing individuals to stay overnight "'is a long-stand-
ing social custom that serves functions recognized as valuable by soci-
ety. '" 9 It correctly concluded that "although society does not recognize as
valuable the task of bagging cocaine ... society does recognize as valuable
the right of property owners or leaseholders to invite persons into the pri-
vacy of their homes to conduct a common task, be it legal or illegal."' 99
The "common task" test of the Minnesota Supreme Court recognizes
the everyday expectations of privacy that we all share, without extending
protection to the casual visitor that concerned the Court in Rakas.200 Engag-
ing in a common task with the owner or leaseholder should be enough to
gain an expectation of privacy; visitors should not bear the additional burden
of demonstrating that they are also "closer" to an overnight guest than to one
simply permitted on the premises. Every day homeowners and leaseholders
intend to share their expectations of privacy with individuals who stay not
195. Id. (quoting Jones, 362 U.S. at 267).
196. See id (citingRakas, 439 U.S. 128(1978)).
197. Rakas, 439 U.S. at 14Z
198. Carter!!, 569N.W.2d at 175 (quoting Olson, 495 U.S. at 98).
199. Id. at 176.
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overnight, but only for a matter of hours. The Justices of the United States
Supreme Court seemed to recognize this during oral arguments, but ignored
it in their opinion. It should be sufficient that a visitor's situation is one
where a court can conclude the leaseholder meant to include him in her right
to privacy granted by the United States Supreme Court, and likely would
have so stated, except that "people seldom say such things." Instead, the
Court in Carter exploited the fact that "people seldom say such things" to
treat two individuals who had been in the apartment for a significant amount
of time and engaged in a common task with the owner as no more connected
to the lessee and the premises than a repair person who enters the house for a
very brief time to fix the homeowner's phone, but not to share her expecta-
tions of privacy.2 1'
From the lessee's perspective, if society values interpersonal privacy,
individuals invited in for extended periods of time to engage in common
tasks or activities must be recognized as sharing the privacy expectations of
the lessee. Professor Mary Coombs has argued that the "expectation of pri-
vacy" standard of Katz has not lived up to its promise to "replace arcane
notions of property law with a standard more sensitive to the complex reali-
ties of life."2°0 The problem, she asserts, is that "courts have applied a nar-
row, individualistic conception of privacy rooted in the right to exclude
others" 203 and ignored the importance of shared privacy. She explains that
"[o]ne reason we protect the legal right to exclude others is to empower the
owner to choose to share his home or other property with his intimates. ' 204
However, "recogniz[ing] the owner's choice only when it is embodied in a
legal document or in a formal relationship renders it nearly nugatory."205
Professor Coombs points out that when "people choose to share their things
with another person, legal rights seem unimportant. '206 She explains that the
United States Supreme Court's application of its "reasonable expectation of
200. See Rakas, 439 U.S. at 145. Justice Kennedy constructed a hypothetical that illustrates this in a drug dealing sce-
nario:
If respondents here had been visiting twenty homes, each for a minute or two, to drop off a bag of
cocaine and were apprehended by a policeman wrongfully present in the nineteenth home; or if they
had left the goods at a home where they were not staying and the police had seized the goods in their
absence, we would have said that Rakas compels rejection of any privacy interest respondents might
assert.
Carter Il, 119 S. Ct. at 479 (Kennedy, I., concurring). But Justice Kennedy failed to see the distinction between stopping by to
deliver cocaine and being invited in by the leaseholder to prepare the cocaine for delivery, with the leaseholder participating in
that activity. Instead, Justice Kennedy stated that similar to the hypothetical he constructed, Rakaw compelled the rejection of
respondents' claim in the case before the Court because "respondents have established no meaningful tie or connection to the
owner, the owner's home, or the owner's expectation of privacy." Id.
201. At oral argument, one Justice suggested that a distinction could be drawn based on the "notion of common enter-
prise:"
[T]here is, it seems to me, something intuitively different about three people sitting around a table, in
this case packaging cocaine, and on the other hand the individual who comes in to fix the telephone,
who really is admitted to do a job and is not engaged in a concerted activity with the homeowner.
Transcript of Oral Argument at 1 -1 2 Carter III (No. 97-1147).
202. Coombs, supra note 144, at 1593-94.
203. Id. at 1594. In Carter III, the State of Minnesota cited the inability of the defendants to exclude others as a factor
that counted against the defendants' claim of a reasonable expectation of privacy. See Transcript of Oral Argument at 10, Carter
III (No. 97-1147).





privacy" test in Rakas and Rawlings "assumes that expectations of privacy
stem only from narrowly conceived property rights or other specifically
articulated relationships .... It assumes, absent explicit proof to the con-
trary, that people do not share." 27 As a result, the Court is "blind to much
day to day human interaction, and its jurisprudence ignores concerns that
grow out of relationships that are not readily articulated.
208
This is precisely what happened in Carter. The Minnesota Supreme
Court was able to put aside the illegal nature of the activity the defendants
were engaged in and recognize that the lessee intended to share her privacy
with the defendants in much the same way people do every day and which
society recognizes as valuable. But Chief Justice Rehnquist focused on the
lack of any previous relationship with the lessee and the lack of "anything
similar to the overnight guest relationship in Olson to suggest a degree of
acceptance into the household."20 9 To him, the apartment was "simply a
place [for these defendants] to do business." 210 He did not see a specific
property right or a clearly articulated relationship upon which to justify an
expectation of privacy.
Professor Coombs explains that judicial decisions in this arena depend
on "the way courts frame the facts with respect to time, place and general-
ity. '' 211 As soon as "these frames are imposed, the legal doctrine appears
capable of providing relatively predictable outcomes. '212 Courts generally
prefer narrow frames, in part because they "are more precise, more particu-
larized, more 'rigorous.' 213 A narrow frame generally is less protective of
privacy claims of secondary parties, such as visitors to a home or apart-
ment.214 Professor Coombs argues a "wide angle" is necessary to appropri-
ately protect shared privacy, and that courts fail to recognize that the use of
narrow frames is "often false to the parties' expectations and the manner in
which those expectations are formed.
215
The power of framing is evident in Carter. The State of Minnesota
complained that the Minnesota Supreme Court overvalued the relationship
between the defendants and the lessee rather than focusing on the defen-
dants' relationship to the property.216 The Solicitor General argued that the
Minnesota Supreme Court considered the relationship at "so high a level of
generality that its conclusions were incongruous. ' 217 The government
wanted a narrower frame, one that would focus on the defendants as drug
dealers rather than as individuals engaged in a common endeavor with the
207. Id. at 1631.
208. Coombs, supra note 144, at 1631.
209. Carter!11, 119 S. Ct. at 473.
210. Id. at 473.
211. Coombs, supranote 144, at 1632.
212. Id.
213. Id. at 1634.
214. See id at 1635.
215. Coanbs. supranote 144, at 1634.
216. See Petitioner's Briefat 11, Carter III (No. 97-1147).
217. Brief for the United States at 21. Carter !I! (No. 97-1147).
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lessee of the apartment. The government got the frame it wanted in the first
sentence of the opinion when Chief Justice Rehnquist set the scene:
"Respondents and the lessee of an apartment were sitting in one of its rooms,
bagging cocaine. ''218  Justice Kennedy followed suit, focusing on the defen-
dants' use of "Thompson's house simply as a convenient processing station,
their purpose involving nothing more than the mechanical act of chopping
and packing a substance for distribution. ' 219 This was especially crucial in
Justice Kennedy's opinion because he was willing to grant "almost all social
guests" a "legitimate expectation of privacy" in their host's home.220 The
power of framing suggests that visitors who are not engaged in criminal
activity might be viewed differently and prevail. But, of course, non-crimi-
nals will not find themselves challenging the introduction of evidence at a
suppression hearing. As Justice Frankfurter has explained, it is one of the
unfortunate features of the Fourth Amendment that we must depend on not
very nice people to assert our rights.221 That being so, the expectations of
privacy of citizens in others' homes are in danger.
The United States Supreme Court seems unable to recognize the differ-
ence between granting entry to a delivery person to deliver pizza or a repair
person to repair an appliance, and inviting a friend, relative or acquaintance
in to share a meal, play a card game or participate in a book club. That fail-
ure threatens our ability to enjoy our privacy outside our own homes and
limits our ability to share the privacy of our homes with others. Or perhaps,
if our friends make a habit of reading United States Supreme Court deci-
sions, we may begin receiving stilted invitations from those who wish to
include us in the privacy of their homes. These friends will know that they
have to talk in ways "people seldom do" and make explicit that they are
granting "a temporary possessory interest in [their homes] so that [we] will
share the right to privacy that the Supreme Court says that [they] own. '222
Of course, if the "hidden holding" of Carter emerges, guests like those
described above will enjoy protection without a stilted invitation. Justice
Kennedy asserted that he would provide protection to virtually all social
guests, as presumably would the four Justices who voted to grant the defen-
dants protection in Carter.223 It is unclear, however, how guests will con-
218. Carter lll, 119 S. Ct. at 471. Professor Coombs finds a notable example offraming in Justice Blackam's dissent in
Hardwick v. Bowers, 478 U.S. 186 (1986), where he states:
This case is no more about "a fundamental right to engage in homosexual sodomy," as the court pur-
ports to declare, than Stanley v. Georgia was about a fundamental right to watch obscene movies, or
Katz u United States was about a fundamental right to place interstate bets from a telephone booth.
Rather, this case is about. .. "the rigsht to be let alone."
ld. at 2848 (Blackmun. J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
Another recent notable example of framing can be found in Justice White's majority opinion in Jacobson A United
States, 503 U.S. 540 (1992), a case in which the defendant was charged with purchasing child pornography but alleged entrap-
ment by the government. Justice White began the facts by stating: "In Febnrmy 1984, petitioner, a 56-year-old veteran-tumed-
farmer who supprted Is elderly father in Nebraska, ordered two magazines and a brochure from a California adult bookstore."
leaving little doubt about the outcome of the case.
219. Carterlll 119S. Ct. at479.
220. Id. at 478.
221. See United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56 (1950) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). "[It] is a fair summary of history
to say that the safeguards of liberty have frequently been forged in controversies involving not very nice people." Id. at 59.
222. Rakas, 439U.S. at 167 (White. ,. dissenting).
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vince Chief Justice Rehnquist that their situation is more like Olson, and it is
clear that anyone who is not an overnight guest will not get protection from
Justices Scalia and Thomas. 24 Much as this Article argues that Carter,
properly analyzed, is an easy case and one in which the defendants should
have prevailed, Justice Scalia believes that if the case were "analyzed under
the text of the Constitution as traditionally understood" it is "not remotely
difficult. '22 To Justice Scalia, the possessive "their" in the Fourth Amend-
ment is the key to the issue. He acknowledges "the phrase 'their... houses'
in this provision is, in isolation, ambiguous" in that it could mean "their
respective houses, so that the protection extends to each person only in his
own house" 226 and it could also mean 'their respective and each other's
houses,' so that each person would be protected even when visiting the
house of someone else."221 But he concludes that
it is not linguistically possible to give the provision the latter,
expansive interpretation with respect to 'houses' without giving it
the same interpretation with respect to the nouns that are parallel
to 'houses'--'persons ... papers, and effects'--which would give
me a constitutional right not to have your person unreasonably
searched,28
a conclusion he finds "so absurd that it has to my knowledge never been
contemplated." 229 Thus, in his view, "[t]he obvious meaning of the provi-
sion is that each person has the right to be secure against unreasonable
searches and seizures in his own person, house, papers, and effects. ' 230 He
admits, however, that "this is not to say that the Fourth Amendment protects
only the Lord of the Manor who holds his estate in fee simple." 231 He recog-
nizes that "people call a house 'their' home when legal title is in the bank,
when they rent it, and even when they merely occupy it rent-free -- so long
as they actually live there. ' '232 He also recognizes, and apparently would not
change (although he calls it the absolute limit), the protection that the Court
has extended to an overnight guest in another's home.233 He argues that
while "it is plausible to regard a person's overnight lodging as at least his
'temporary' residence, it is entirely impossible to give that characterization
to an apartment that he uses to package cocaine. '234 He states that "[defen-
223. See Carter 111, 119 S. Ct. at 480 (Breyer, J., concurring). See also id at 482 (Oimtburg, J., dissenting).
224. See id at 477 (Scalia, J., ctncuring).
225. Id. at 474.
226. Carter 111, 119 S. Ct. at 474.
227. Id.
228. Id. at 474-75.
229. Id. at 475.
230. Carter 111, 119 S. Ct. at 475.
231. .Id. at 476.
232. Id.
233. See id. at 477.
234. Carterlll, 119 S. C. at 477.
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dants] here were not searched in 'their... hous[e]' under any interpretation
of the phrase that bears the remotest relationship to the well understood
meaning of the Fourth Amendment." 5
But once Justice Scalia is willing to go beyond the actual homeowner
or lessee, it is not clear why the text demands the line be drawn where he
suggests.236 He derides the dissent for arguing that the Court should "ignore
this clear text and four-century-old tradition and apply instead the notori-
ously unhelpful" Katz test.237 He counters with the argument that "the only
thing the past three decades have established about the Katz test.., is that,
unsurprisingly, those 'actual (subjective) expectations of privacy' 'that soci-
ety is prepared to recognize as "reasonable,"'... bear an uncanny resem-
blance to those expectations of privacy that this Court considers
reasonable." 231 Of course, one could argue that any "plain meaning of the
text" test would result in plain meanings that bear an uncanny resemblance
to the meaning Justice Scalia considers plain--or more cynically, to the
meaning that results in the denial of protections of citizens' Fourth Amend-
ment rights.
VI. CONCLUSION
In Minnesota v. Carter 39 the United States Supreme Court had the
opportunity to recognize the expectations of privacy of short-term visitors as
legitimate. At least five Justices were willing to provide protection beyond
the "overnight guest" bright line rule of Minnesota v. Olson240 and include
"almost all social guests." Unfortunately for the defendants in Carter,
although Justice Kennedy favored a rule of broad protection for social
guests, he was unable to see past the defendants' illegal behavior and recog-
nize their expectations of privacy. Unfortunately for the rest of us, past expe-
rience suggests that the "hidden holding" of Carter--that as a general rule
social guests have a legitimate expectation of privacy in their host's home--
likely will stay hidden. Because the majority opinion provides little guid-
ance for future cases, lower courts will be inclined to focus on the result in
the case to fashion a rule denying expectations of privacy to most short term
visitors. The result will be a "standing" jurisprudence that undervalues
expectations of interpersonal privacy and fails to recognize that "much of
what is important in human life takes place in a situation of shared pri-
vacy.12
4 1
This Article has argued that the Minnesota Supreme Court was better
235. Id.
236. See Eulis Simien, The Interrelationship of the Scope of the Fourth Amendment and Standing to Object to Unreason-
able Searches, 41 ARK. L. REV. 487, 551 (1988) (recognizing the need for defendants to demonstrate "their" home was searched,
but adopting a more liberal interpretation of this requirement than the one that Justice Scalia argues is obvious).
237. Carter Ill, 119 S. Ct. at 477 (Scalia, J., concurring).
238. Id. (citing Katn, 389 US. at 361).
239. 119 S. Ct 469 (1998).
240. 495 U.S. 91 (1990).
241. Coomb, supra note 144, at 1593.
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able to factor out the illegal nature of the defendants' conduct and put aside
labels in order to craft a workable rule that recognized and protected the
everyday expectations that we all share. As this Article goes to print, the
Minnesota Supreme Court has requested briefs addressing whether the
defendants' expectations of privacy in this case should be protected under
the State Constitution. For the citizens of Minnesota, there is hope that their
everyday expectations of privacy will be recognized as legitimate when they
invite neighbors, relatives and friends into their homes to share a meal, play
a game of cards, discuss politics or otherwise attempt to share their privacy.
For citizens in other states who rely on the United States Supreme Court to
protect their privacy, new privacy shades on their windows might be in
order.
